In this paper, I examine Argumentation Theory (AT), a semantic framework best known for its detailed analyses of expressions with non-truth-conditional meaning, such as but and even. I sketch the development of the theory from its inception in the mid/late 1970s to the present day and I examine the basic AT notions and some of the theory's implications. In the last section, I discuss some problems with AT, e.g. its lack of a principled semantics/pragmatics distinction and its inability to explain why language is, quite routinely, used to convey information about the world. I then briefly suggest how a cognitive theory with a principled semantics/pragmatics distinction, such as Relevance Theory, can avoid the most serious problems encountered by AT.
Introduction
While many current semantic theories set aside those linguistic expressions that don't succumb to a truth-conditional treatment, e.g. but, even, and yet, both Argumentation Theory (AT) and Relevance Theory (RT) have given such elements particular attention. It is not my concern in this paper to make detailed comparisons of their specific analyses but rather to examine some fundamental theoretical differences between them. For instance, the analyses of but within the two theories (Anscombre & Ducrot (1977) in AT, Blakemore (1989) in RT) are remarkably similar and, arguably, the grounds for choosing between them lie more with their theoretical underpinnings than with the details of the particular accounts. For this reason, my aim here is to investigate the central concepts and assumptions of Argumentation Theory. Obviously, it would quite likely be the work of a lifetime to capture AT, a theory which has been evolving for a quarter of a century, in all its detail and to do it justice in every nuance. Therefore, all I Iten can hope to do here, is give a (possibly too) broad characterisation of the theory and some of its development, and point out some of the difficulties it runs into.
In its present state, AT is a non-cognitive, non-truth-conditional semantic theory, which takes linguistic utterances (as opposed to abstract sentence-types) as its domain. Its aim is to provide a semantic deep structure for each utterance, which includes a specification of the argumentative potential of the utterance (Nyan 1998). As mentioned above, the theory has produced some promising accounts of linguistic expressions encoding non-truth-conditional meaning, notably but and even (see e.g. A & D (1983) , Nyan (1998) ). However, as will be shown in this paper, the theory itself suffers from some very serious flaws, especially in its later incarnations (e.g. Ducrot (1993) ).
In sections 2 to 5, I will give an outline of the central points of AT, show its development spanning two decades and indicate (only indicate) how argumentation theorists account for certain key non-truth-conditional expressions. In these sections I will mostly keep criticisms and queries to footnotes so as not to distract from the presentation. I will give a fuller critical discussion and evaluation of the theory in section 6, paying special attention to the move from a semantics with some truthconditional and some non-truth-conditional elements to a completely non-truthconditional semantics as it is argued for by Ducrot (1993) . In the final sub-section, the AT approach will briefly be compared with the cognitive approach of Relevance Theory, which also takes a non-truth-conditional view of linguistic semantics, but, unlike AT, maintains a distinction between two kinds of linguistic meaning, conceptual and procedural, and applies the notion of truth conditions to mental representations.
The beginnings of Argumentation Theory
AT is based on the view that it is a fundamental characteristic of utterances that they can be used as premises or conclusions in arguments. It's important to note that the nature of these arguments is such that they cannot be captured by the standard rules of logic. Anscombre & Ducrot (1976) observed that utterances with the same informational (i.e. truth-conditional) content cannot always be used as arguments in favour of the same set of conclusions. For instance, according to A & D, (1) and (2) have the same informational content, i.e. the same truth conditions 1 . However, (1) can be used as an argument in favour of both (3a) and (b) . (2), on the other hand, can only be used as an rgument in favour of (3a). Thus, (4a) and (b) are both perfectly acceptable, whereas (5b) is unacceptable.
(1) Peter is the same height as Mary.
(2) Peter is as tall as Mary.
(3) a. Peter is tall for his age.
b. Peter is short for his age. (4) a. Peter is tall for his age: he's the same height as Mary who is a year older.
b. Peter is short for his age: he's the same height as Mary who is a year younger (5) a. Peter is tall for his age: he's as tall as Mary who is a year older.
b. *Peter is short for his age: he's as tall as Mary who is a year younger.
(examples translated and adapted from Anscombre & Ducrot 1976: 10) Examples of this sort led Anscombre & Ducrot to believe that a purely truth-conditional semantics was not sufficient and that the argumentative potential of an utterance was an important aspect of its meaning. In early AT (e.g. A & D 1976) , the argumentative potential of an utterance was characterised in terms of the conclusions it could be used to support. Thus, it would be part of the meaning of (1) that it can be used as an argument for both (3a) and its contrary (3b). In fact, A & D would say that the argumentative orientation of (1) was neutral (see e.g. Moeschler & Reboul (1994:314/5) ). Similarly, the fact that (2) can only be used to support the conclusion in (3a) is part of the meaning of (2). Unlike (1), the argumentative orientation of (2) is not neutral; this utterance is oriented towards conclusions of the type in (3a).
The fact that (1) and (2), and other examples of the same sort, clearly differ in their encoded meaning, even though they don't differ in their truth-conditional content 2 , led A & D (1976: 8) to postulate an integrated pragmatics (pragmatique intégrée). They call it a 'pragmatics' because it is concerned with the sort of meaning that can't be captured in terms of traditional truth-conditional semantics. What they mean by 'integrated' is that the non-truth-conditional aspects of the meaning of as…as in (2) are, nevertheless, aspects of its encoded meaning and do not depend on the recovery of some prior truthconditional semantic meaning the way, for example, Gricean conversational implicatures depend on the recovery of the truth-conditional content of the utterance ('what is said'). In perhaps more intuitive terms, A & D's integrated pragmatics could be seen as a nontruth-conditional semantics, which they saw, at that time, as existing alongside a 44 Iten traditional truth-conditional semantics. In effect, it seems that, the postulation of an integrated pragmatics means that there is no semantics/pragmatics distinction in AT, since it is not clear that A & D also allow for a non-integrated pragmatics which deals with non-encoded aspects of utterance meaning. It will be seen at the end of this paper that this is an important issue.
Argumentative contents, the law of negation & the law of inversion

Sentence (phrase) and utterance (énoncé)
Before presenting A & D (1983)'s more detailed way of accounting for examples like (1) and (2), let me say something about their conception of the basic notions of sentence (phrase) and utterance (énoncé). As mentioned in the introduction, A & D (1983) are interested in utterance meaning. By 'utterance' (énoncé) they (1983: 84) mean utterance token, i.e., as they put it, linguistic material with 'historical' characteristics (e.g. a specific position in space and time). They contrast this with the notions of utterance type (énoncé-type) and 'sentence' (phrase). According to them, the utterance type is the linguistic material the utterance consists of. Thus, for A & D, (6b) and (7), which they see as an 'act of hoping', are tokens of the same utterance type because, at least in French, they both contain exactly the same linguistic material.
(6) a. Est-ce que Pierre va venir au rendez-vous?
'Is Peter coming to the meeting?' b. J'espère.
'I hope so' (7) J'espère. 'I'm hoping. ' (A & D 1983: 84) A & D's 'sentence' (phrase), on the other hand, is a theoretical construct, the deep structure underlying an utterance (token). Thus, for them (6b) is a token of the 'sentence' in (8), while the 'sentence' underlying (7) will be just J'espère.
(8) J'espère que p. 'I hope that p.'
For A & D, utterance tokens are the starting point, the 'observable facts' (A & D 1983: 80-81; Ducrot 1984: 180) on which their work is based. In a bid to account for the eaning of utterances, each of them is assigned a 'sentence' or deep structure. While statements concerning utterances are intended to describe the 'facts', those concerning 'sentences' are intended to explain them. This shows that A & D's notion of 'sentence' (phrase) is significantly different from what is generally understood by 'sentence' in linguistics and philosophy. For this reason, I am following Nyan (1998) in referring to A & D's phrase as 'deep structure' rather than 'sentence' in the rest of this paper.
A & D (1983: 85) and Ducrot (1984: 180) call the semantic value of utterances sense and the semantic value of deep structures signification. Analogous to utterances and deep structures themselves, senses are observable, but significations are not (Ducrot 1984: 180) . According to Ducrot (1984: 181-183) , the signification of a deep structure is a set of instructions as to how to assign sense to the utterance. Thus to know the signification of the deep structure underlying (9), is to know what to do to interpret an utterance of it.
(9) The weather's nice.
(from Ducrot 1984: 181) Ducrot claims that it is part of the signification of the deep structure underlying (9) that the hearer is instructed to look for the place the speaker is talking about and to accept that the speaker is asserting the existence of fine weather in that place. The sense of the utterance, on the other hand, Ducrot describes as a description of the event of making the utterance (énonciation). This includes information about the illocutionary force of the utterance and its argumentative potential. According to Ducrot (1984: 180) , the systematic association between senses and utterances is an 'observable fact'. To explain this observable association, he chooses to associate the theoretical construct of signification with the deep structures that underlie utterances. He believes that this is an interesting way of proceeding because he supposes that it's possible to formulate laws to calculate the signification of a deep structure on the basis of its lexico-grammatical properties and different laws to predict the sense of an utterance on the basis of the signification of the deep structure that underlies the utterance. While Ducrot sees the signification of deep structures in terms of instructions, A & D (1983) saw it in terms of contents (contenus) . This is what the next sub-section is concerned with. Anscombre & Ducrot (1983: 79-113) give a detailed analysis of the meaning of utterances like (1) and (2) above. First, they make it clear that they don't want to assign 46 Iten meaning to utterances themselves, but rather to the deep structures underlying them. Thus, each deep structure is given a set of 'contents' (contenus), some of them asserted, some of them presupposed. The asserted contents are equivalent to informational or 'factual ' (or, indeed, truth-conditional) contents, and at least some of the presupposed contents are seen as argumentative. According to Anscombre & Ducrot (1983: 102) , (2) will have the asserted content in (10a) and the presupposed content in (10b).
Contents (contenus)
(2) Peter is as tall as Mary. (10) Although they don't spell this out, it seems reasonable to assume that they would say that (1) has the same asserted, or factual, content as (2), i.e. (10a), but that it lacks the (argumentative) presupposed content in (10b). Hence its neutral argumentative orientation. The idea is that these contents are arbitrarily assigned to a finite number of core deep structures (phrases-noyaux) and that the contents of more complex deep structures can be calculated on the basis of the contents of the core deep structures which make up the more complex deep structure (A & D 1983: 97) . This is done with the help of two basic rules: the law of negation (la Loi de Négation) and the law of inversion (la Loi d'Inversion), which will be illustrated below. All in all, A & D's semantic description involves three steps or mechanisms. The first assigns a set of asserted (factual) contents and presupposed contents, some of which are argumentative, to each core deep structure. The second derives new contents from those that make up the meaning of the core deep structure using the laws of negation and inversion. The third uses the results of the first two mechanisms to assign an argumentative orientation to the whole (complex) deep structure. 4 The best way to see how this works is to look at some examples.
.3 The law of negation (la Loi de Négation) Anscombre & Ducrot (1983: 99-104 ) account for the meaning of (11) as follows.
(11) Peter is wrong to believe that he's as tall as Mary. (12) a. But he is quite tall.
b. *But he is quite short.
First of all, they observe that an utterance of (11) can be followed quite easily with an utterance of (12a) but not with an utterance of (12b). They analyse the meaning of but in such a way that it can only felicitously connect two clauses with opposite argumentative orientation 5 . Therefore, A & D predict that (11) and the clause after but in (12a) have opposite argumentative orientations, while (11) and the clause after but in (12b) have the same argumentative orientation (hence the infelicity when (11) is followed by (12b)). They then proceed to show that this is the case by appealing to the law of negation.
A & D start by assuming that P in (13) has the asserted content a and the presupposed content b. They then assign the whole deep structure in (13) the asserted content α and the presupposed contents 1 and 2 in (14) 6 .
(13) X is wrong to believe that P. Now (11) can be assigned contents on the basis of the contents of (2) and (13). (11) & D call this process of deriving a presupposed content which applies to the asserted content of a deep structure from one which doesn't apply to the asserted content with the help of the laws of the second mechanism centrage (A & D 1983: 103) .
The third mechanism assigns an argumentative orientation to a deep structure on the basis of its argumentative presupposition after this presupposition has been 'centred' on the asserted content of the deep structure. This means that now an argumentative orientation can be assigned to the deep structure underlying (11) by usingÃ ' 1 in (18). In this way, (11) comes out as having the same argumentative orientation as 'Peter is not tall', which is obviously the opposite of the argumentative orientation of 'Peter is tall'. This explains why the use of but to connect (11) and (12a) is felicitous, while the result of using but to connect (11) with (12b) is rather less acceptable.
The law of inversion (la Loi d'Inversion)
As Anscombre & Ducrot (1983: 104-111) observe, the law of inversion concerns two sets of argument and conclusion. First, the law of inversion is given at the (observational) level of the utterance (as opposed to the theoretical level of the deep structure of the utterances, i.e. what A & D refer to as the 'sentence'). It states that if utterance u is a stronger argument for conclusion c than utterance u' for conclusion c', then the negation of u' (not-u') will be a stronger argument for not-c' than not-u is for not-c. This shows again that A & D's argumentative laws are a far cry from the rules of standard logic. Before saying more about the law of inversion and its applications, let me say something about the notion of the comparative strength of arguments, which, as A & D (1983: 105) note, is basic to AT.
According to A & D (1976: 15) , u is a stronger argument than u' in favour of c if a speaker who uses u' as an argument for c would also have to admit u as an argument for c, but not vice versa. For example, (20) could be seen as a stronger argument in favour of (21) This explains the notion of argumentative strength for utterances supporting the same conclusion.
Examples (19)- (21) can also be used to show that the law of inversion states something intuitively correct in cases where u and u' are arguments for the same conclusion. Let (20) be u, (19) u' and (21) both c and c'. Now, it has been shown above that (20) is a stronger argument in favour of (21) than (19). According to the law of inversion, the negation of (19) should therefore be a stronger argument for the negation of (21) than is the negation of (20). The negations of (19)- (21) not-u' (23) Jane doesn't have pneumonia.
not-u (24) Jane can sit the exam this afternoon.
not-c = not-c'
Intuitively, the law of inversion makes the right prediction in this case. (22) does indeed seem to be a stronger argument than (23) in favour of (24): a speaker who accepts that the fact that Jane doesn't have pneumonia is an argument in favour of her being able to sit an exam that afternoon will also have to accept Jane's not having a sore throat as an argument for the same conclusion. However, someone accepting Jane's not having a sore throat as an argument for Jane's being able to sit an exam will not necessarily have to accept Jane's not having pneumonia as an argument for the same conclusion. After all, Jane could have a heavy cold, a state of affairs compatible with her not having pneumonia, which would nevertheless be an argument for her not sitting the exam. This seems to show that, intuitively, the law of inversion is right for cases where c = c'. However, the law of inversion is also supposed to apply to cases where two utterances are arguments for different conclusions. The problem with this is that A & D do not make it clear how their notion of argumentative strength applies to utterances that are arguments for different conclusions 9 . All they do is give an example of a case where c and c' are not identical but opposites.
According to A & D (1983: 107) , the but in (25) Anscombre & Ducrot (1983: 107-109) contrast this with (27), where, according to them, but is not scalar in nature and where, consequently, an utterance of the form 'not-not-c (= c): not-q but not-p' would not be acceptable to a speaker uttering (27) , as (28) shows. (25), an utterance of 'p but q' supports the conclusion q supports because q is a stronger argument for c than p is for not-c. In cases of non-scalar but, like the one in (27), on the other hand, this is supposed to be because the speaker gives more importance to q than she does to p.
10 Now, let's look at the formal use of the law of inversion.
A & D (1983: 110/1) use (29) to show how the law of inversion, this time formulated at the level of contents, works formally.
(29) Peter is wrong to believe that he is taller than Mary and even that he is as tall.
In fact, they don't actually give the formal version of the law of inversion, but it seems plausible that, analogous to the law of negation, this law for contents would look something like (30). 
11
Before looking at its application to (29), a word needs to be said about A & D's analysis of even. According to them (1983: 105) , even in an utterance of the form 'p and even q' indicates that p and q support the same conclusion and that the speaker sees q as a stronger argument than p for that conclusion. Thus, A & D's prediction is that Peter is wrong to believe that he is as tall as Mary is a stronger argument than Peter is wrong to believe that he is taller than Mary for some conclusion c which they both support, because, otherwise, (29) would not be felicitous.
As has been shown above, (11), the second conjunct of (29), has the asserted content and the argumentative presupposed content 1 given in (16).
(11) Peter is wrong to believe that he's as tall as Mary. (16) If this is combined with what was said above about the contents of 'X is wrong to believe that P', (33), the first conjunct of (29), can now be assigned the asserted content ' and the argumentative presupposed content 1 ' in (34).
(33) Peter is wrong to believe that he is taller than Mary.
At this point A & D make use of an axiom of the second mechanism, which states that if [x > y] and [x = y] are two contents that are arguments for the same conclusion, then [x > y] is always the stronger argument than [x = y]. If one applies this axiom to the contents of (11) and (33), the two conjuncts of (29), (29) can be assigned the argumentative content γ in (35) . (35) Now the law of inversion can be applied to (35) to yield (36).
The third mechanism, which assigns argumentative relations to deep structures (rather than contents), contains the law in ( This means that it follows from (36) that (11) and (33), the two conjuncts of (29), have the same argumentative orientation and that (11) is a stronger argument than (33), which explains why the use of even in (29) is felicitous. On their original definition, u 2 is a stronger argument than u 1 for some conclusion c if a speaker who accepts u 1 as an argument for c also has to accept u 2 , but not vice versa. One of the examples A & D use is the utterance pair in (38). The original AT account of the meaning of nearly (presque) states that the word indicates that an utterance containing it has the same argumentative orientation (i.e. supports the same types of conclusion) as the corresponding utterance without nearly and that p is a stronger argument than nearly p. In other words, if the AT account of nearly is correct, (38b) should be a stronger argument than (38a) for the same type of conclusion 13 .
(38) a. The barrel is nearly empty. (38b) is indeed a stronger argument than (38a) for a conclusion like (39), for example: Any speaker who accepts that (38a) is an argument for (39) will also have to accept that (38b) is an argument for the same conclusion, but not vice versa. As (41a) and (b) show, it is not the case that any speaker who accepts (38a) as an argument for (40) also has to accept (38b); for (38b) isn't an argument for (40) at all.
41) a. The barrel is nearly empty. So, we need to drink just a little more. b. The barrel is empty. So, we need to drink just a little more.
The existence of examples like (41a) (1983: 163) an argumentation is a discourse with at least two utterances u 1 and u 2 , one of which is the premise (or argument) and the other the conclusion. An act of arguing, on the other hand, is an illocutionary act 15 which is part of the meaning of every utterance, whether it is used as a premise or as a conclusion in a given argumentation. This act consists in attributing a certain degree of a certain property (e.g. tallness, helpfulness, emptiness, etc.) to one or more entities or objects. This, according to A & D (1983: 166) , is part of the meaning of the utterance in the sense that the utterance "presents itself" as accomplishing such an act. The idea is that the kind of property a given utterance is taken to attribute to an object on a given occasion determines the kind of conclusion in favour of which the utterance can be used.
In their new definition of argumentative strength, A & D make use of this notion of act of arguing. Instead of defining argumentative strength and argumentative orientation in terms of conclusions, they now define them in terms of the properties the utterances attribute to objects and the degrees to which they do so. On A & D (1983: 167) is a stronger argument than u 1 if they both present their object as possessing the same property R and u 2 indicates a higher degree than u 1 . In those cases where u 1 and u 2 support the same conclusion, u 2 will do so more strongly than u 1 , but the definition of argumentative strength no longer demands that they should support the same conclusion, because the definition of argumentative orientation is no longer given in terms of conclusions 18 . This solves the problem posed by (41a) and (b) without a change in the account of nearly, because even in those examples (38b), the barrel is empty, attributes a greater degree of emptiness to the barrel than does (38a), the barrel is nearly empty, and, therefore, (38a) and (b) have the same argumentative orientation and (38b) is a stronger argument than (38a) on the new definitions. It's just that in (41a) and (b) the two 16 This might make it look as though (1) and (2) have the same argumentative orientation, because they seem to attribute the same property to the same entity, i.e. they both seem to attribute height to Peter. However, A & D would be likely to say that as tall as attributes tallness, whereas the same height as can attribute tallness or shortness. This highlights a general worry about what a property is on this picture, i.e. why are tallness and shortness different properties? Similarly, it isn't clear why there couldn't be a property of near-emptiness, which would mean that (38a) and (b) don't attribute the same property to the same object -one could attribute emptiness and the other near-emptiness. 17 This change in the definition of opposite argumentative orientation has an undesirable effect on A & D's account of the meaning of but. Remember that it was a necessary (and, in the case of non-scalar but, also sufficient) condition of the felicitous use of but that the two conjuncts should have opposite argumentative orientation without contradicting each other. When argumentative orientation was defined in terms of conclusions and two utterances were said to have opposite argumentative orientation if they supported opposite conclusions, (i) would have been ruled out, because it is hard to see what opposite conclusions could be supported by Peter likes chocolate and Most birds can fly.
(i) ?Peter likes chocolate but most birds can fly. However, given A & D's new definition of opposite argumentative orientation, (i) should be acceptable, because the two conjuncts do indeed not attribute the same property to the same object to any degree whatsoever and the two conjuncts certainly don't contradict each other. 18 It's interesting that, by this stage, A & D seem to have given up (or at least forgotten) the idea that different degrees of argumentative strength can also be attributed to arguments with different argumentative orientations (as allowed for by the law of inversion). If the new definition of argumentative strength given here is the whole story, A & D can no longer claim that there is such a thing as the scalar but discussed above -the law of inversion will no longer be applicable in cases where two utterances don't attribute the same property to their objects, because the notion of argumentative strength only applies to utterances that attribute the same property. tterances can't support the same conclusion. It will become clear below that this change is the first step in the direction of topoi and topical forms.
Argumentative operators, topoi, topical forms & topical fields
Argumentative operators
In argumentation theory, expressions like as … as, nearly, but and many others are referred to as 'argumentative operators' (e.g. Nyan 1998: 52) 19 . As the discussion above may have made clear, these argumentative operators can be seen as determining the argumentative orientation, or constraining the argumentative potential, of utterances. Thus, the presence of as tall as in (2) had the effect of adding the (argumentative) presupposed content (10b) to the meaning of the utterance. (1), on the other hand, which has the same asserted content as (2), but doesn't contain as tall as, doesn't carry this presupposed content.
(1) Peter is the same height as Mary. (2) Peter is as tall as Mary.
Similarly, nearly in (38a) has been analysed as determining the argumentative orientation of its host utterance, in that it indicates that an utterance containing it has the same argumentative orientation as a corresponding utterance without nearly. This would be a banal observation if it wasn't for the fact that, from the point of view of informational content, 'nearly X' is equivalent to 'not X'. This is made even more interesting by the fact that the argumentative orientation of an utterance containing barely, e.g. (42), is the opposite of that of the same utterance without barely, e.g. (38b), in spite of the fact that 'barely X' is informationally equivalent to 'X'.
(38) a. The barrel is nearly empty.
b. The barrel is empty. (42) The barrel is barely empty.
While (38a) and (b) support the conclusion in (39), (42) can, in the same context, only be used to support its negation, (43).
(39) We need to get a fresh barrel. (44) and (45) could be said to have the same factual (or truth-conditional) content. However, (45) contains the argumentative operator only, while (44) doesn't. Given what was said above about argumentative operators constraining the argumentative orientation of the utterance containing them, one would expect (44) to be capable of being used as an argument in favour of some conclusions for which (45) cannot be used. However, Nyan claims that (46a) and (b) and (47a) and (b) show that both (44) and (45) can be used as arguments in favour of hurry up or take your time. In other words, both (44) and (45) are neutral from the point of view of argumentative orientation. Thus, the presence of only in (45) doesn't seem to make a difference to the utterance's argumentative potential. As a matter of fact, at first glance, (47a) does not look terribly acceptable. However, if a suitable context is set up, it becomes perfectly acceptable. Imagine for example that Peter and Mary are going to a concert which starts at half past eight and it takes them twenty minutes to get there. Peter is not quite ready and has started slowing down, believing that it's quarter past eight and too late for them to make the first half of the concert. In this context it seems perfectly natural for Mary to utter (47a). As this shows, the presence of only in (45) doesn't necessarily make a difference to the range of conclusions that can be reached on its basis. Nevertheless, A & D feel that only does make a difference to the argumentative content of (45). The notions of 'topos' (based on Aristotle's notion) and 'topical form' were introduced to capture the difference in rgumentative content between (44) and (45). These notions take further the ideas behind the new definitions discussed in 3.5.
Topoi and topical forms
According to Moeschler & Reboul (1994:317-322) and Nyan (1998: 52-59), a topos is an argumentative rule shared by a given community (which need have no more members than the speaker and the hearer). This argumentative rule is used to license the move from an argument to a conclusion. It is an important feature of topoi that they are scalar in nature. The general form of a topos is given in (48).
(48) The more/less object O possesses property P, the more/less object O' possesses property P'.
As Moeschler & Reboul (1994: 317) point out, if one assumes that proposition A = 'object O possesses property P' and proposition B = 'object O' possesses property P'', then a topos can have the four forms in (49a)-(d), with (49a) reading "the more O is P, the more O' is P' ", (49b) "the less O is P, the less O' is P' ", and so on. As (50) illustrates, there are two incompatible underlying topoi to each set of topical forms. Thus, a speaker who accepts (50a) (or (49a) in the general case) will also have to accept (50b) (or (49b)), but she will not be able to accept (50c) or (d) (or (49c) or (d)).
In Anscombre & Ducrot (1989: 83) 's terminology (49a) and (b) are 'converse' topoi (topoi inverses), as are (49c) and (d). Nyan (1998: 55) refers to the topos underlying (50c) and (d) ((49c) and (d) in the general case) as "the converse topos". Moeschler & Iten Reboul (1994: 317) use the expression 'contrary topoi' (topoi contraires) to refer to the two incompatible topoi underlying (49a, b) and (49c, d) respectively. To avoid confusion I'll refer to incompatible topoi as contrary topoi. Different sequences from argument to conclusion will be licensed by different topoi. Let us call the topos underlying (50a) and (b) T1 and the topos underlying (50c) and (d) T2. In that case, the sequences in (51) and (52) will be licensed by T1, while those in (53) and (54) will be licensed by T2. Recall that the curious thing about (47a) and (b) is that the presence of the argumentative operator only doesn't seem to make a difference to the argumentative potential of its host utterance, since both (47a) and (b) are acceptable, just like their operator-free counterparts (46a) and (b). Let us first look at the different topical forms underlying the sequences in (46) and (47). They are given as TF1-TF4 in (55).
(55) TF1: The more time one has, the more one needs to hurry. TF2: The less time one has, the less one needs to hurry. TF3: The more time one has, the less one needs to hurry. TF4: The less time one has, the more one needs to hurry.
The interesting thing now is that (46) and (47) cannot both be licensed by the same set of topical forms. (46a) can be licensed by TF1 or TF4 and (46b) by TF2 or TF3. In other words, the argument it's eight o'clock can lead to the conclusion hurry up via two different routes and the same goes for the conclusion take your time. This is illustrated in (56). 
Topical fields
The introduction of topical forms means that A & D (e.g. 1989) no longer want to capture the meaning of utterances in terms of asserted and presupposed contents assigned to deep structures. Rather they see the meaning of the deep structure as "the set of topoi whose application is said to be valid when uttered" (A & D 1989: 80) . They (1989:81) describe linguistic predicates as bundles of topoi and they introduce the notion of topical field for networks of topoi. 21 Thus, the meaning of a predicate like work, for 21 As they put it: "A sort of topical field is then substituted for the usual lexical field" (A & D 1989: 81) . I assume that what is meant by "the usual lexical field" is the neo-Saussurean notion, discussed, for TF1   TF3   TF2   TF4   TF1   TF3   TF2   TF4 Iten example, is given by a bundle of topoi involving gradations of work. Some topoi that could be part of the meaning of work are given in (58).
(58) a. The more work, the more success.
b. The less work, the more relaxation. c. The more work, the more fatigue. d. The less work, the more happiness. Obviously, these developments of AT bring with them accounts of examples, like (2), that are quite different from the accounts given in earlier AT.
On their revised account of (2) 23 , Anscombre & Ducrot (1989: 83-85) analyse the deep structure underlying the utterance as requiring that Peter and Mary should be located at the same degree of the initial gradation of tallness in all topoi that link tallness with other gradations, like for instance 'the taller, the better at basketball', 'the taller, the more example in Lyons (1977: 250-261) , i.e. a structured collection of lexemes which cover a conceptual field, e.g. that of colours or 'knowledge and understanding'. 22 As a matter of fact, not only these topoi are linked with work, but also their opposites, i.e. 'the less work, the more success', 'the more work, the more relaxation', 'the less work, the more fatigue', etc. This makes the AT conception of meaning seem somewhat bizarre, as the meaning of the predicate work contains contradictory parts. What is more, the information given by the topoi looks much more like world knowledge than linguistic knowledge and it is not clear that world knowledge should or could be part of linguistic meaning. 23 Presumably, the same would hold for (1).
lumsy', etc. In other words, it is part of the meaning of (2) that any conclusion that can be drawn from Mary's location on the scale of tallness can also be drawn from Peter's location on the same scale and vice versa. Probably the most important aspect of the move from asserted and presupposed contents to topical fields is the fact that it is also a move from a semantics with some truth-conditional (i.e. asserted contents) and some non-truth-conditional elements (i.e. argumentative presupposed contents) to one which is wholly non-truth-conditional. As will be seen in the next section, this move is highly questionable and creates some very serious problems for AT.
New definitions of central AT notions
The introduction of topoi and topical form to replace the idea that the meaning of utterances can be captured in terms of the conclusions for which they can be used as arguments means that the definitions of the central notions of AT, such as argumentative orientation and argumentative force, given in previous sections can no longer be correct. It is therefore remarkable that nowhere in A & D's work (as much of it as is available to me at least) have I been able to find any explicit reformulations of the basic AT definitions. Because it seems important to have at least some idea of how A & D would (or could) now define the notions of argumentative orientation and argumentative strength, I will attempt a guess on the basis of their slightly revised definitions discussed in 3.5.
Where in A & D (1983: 167) they said two utterances would have opposite argumentative orientations if they didn't attribute the same property to the same object to any degree whatsoever, it seems possible that they'd now say that two utterances have opposite argumentative orientations if they are linked to topoi with different initial gradations and, maybe, converse second gradations, like for example T and T' in (59).
(59) T: The nicer the weather, the more pleasant a walk.
T': The more work one has to do, the less pleasant a walk. Now, T could be seen as underlying the first conjunct in (60) and T' the second, and indeed, since but can felicitously link the two conjuncts in (60), they would have been said to have opposite argumentative orientations on A & D's old definitions.
(60) The weather is nice, but I have a lot of work to do.
Iten
It's a little less hard to see how the notion of argumentative strength would be defined now. In A & D (1983: 166), they say that an utterance u 2 will be argumentatively stronger than utterance u 1 if they both attribute the same property to the same object and if u 2 does so to a greater degree than u 1 . The only way I can see in which this could be translated into terms of topical forms is that u 2 will be argumentatively stronger than u 1 if u 2 places its object higher than u 2 on the initial gradation of all topoi linked with the utterances. Thus, (61b) will be stronger than (61a), because the former places its object (i.e. the weather) higher on the gradation of niceness than the latter.
(61) a. The weather is nice. b. The weather is very nice.
The end of informational contents
Introduction
As mentioned above, Anscombre & Ducrot (1989) constitutes a move away from the earlier AT position where argumentative contents were seen as an integral part of the semantic structure of the deep structures underlying utterances, but not the only kind of content; informational or truth-conditional (asserted or factual) contents were also part of the semantic structure of utterances. In their own words, A & D (1989: 77/79) move from a position of considering "argumentation as a component of meaning" to one of "radical argumentativism". As will be seen shortly, this move has some very farreaching and ultimately, I believe, undesirable implications. However, first of all, let us look at the justification A & D (1983, 1989) , and especially Ducrot (1993) , give for this move.
Ascriptivism
The idea that the argumentative function of language, and thus the argumentative aspects of linguistic meaning, should be seen as primary first seems to emerge in chapter 7 of A & D (1983) . In this chapter, A & D (1983: 169) say that, even though so far their accounts had made it look as though they saw language as having two separate functions, namely an informative one and an argumentative one, they really want to work towards a position where the argumentative function of language, and with it argumentative meaning, is primary and the informative function of language secondary.
In that sort of an account, any informational (or truth-conditional) meaning would be derived from an underlying argumentative meaning. The wish to give such an account (1983: 170) want to follow in the footsteps of 'ascriptivists', like Hare (1952) , who would account for the meaning of (62) by saying that it is used to praise Peter, the meaning of (63) by saying that it is used to recommend the hotel, and the meaning of (64) by saying that it is used to attribute responsibility for the act to the agent. A & D (1983: 172)'s account, though in the same spirit as the ascriptivist view, is slightly different. They suggest that utterances like (62)-(64) should be accounted for in purely argumentative terms. That is, according to them, the meaning of (63), for example, should be captured by saying that the utterance can be used as an argument in favour of a conclusion r, with r being something like 'favourable view of the hotel' 24 . There are two potential problems with this, both of which have been used as arguments against ascriptivism (see e.g. Searle 1969: 136-141; Geach 1972: 250-269) .
The first problem is that it is very easily possible to utter something like (63) without recommending the hotel. Thus, (65) is perfectly acceptable.
(65) This hotel is good, but I don't recommend it.
A & D (1983: 172) avoid this problem by saying that it is the meaning of (63) that it can be used as an argument for a favourable view of the hotel, which does not mean that it actually always has to lead to that kind of conclusion. In fact, they argue that the very Iten presence of but in (65) indicates that the two conjuncts are arguments for opposite conclusions 25 and that this supports their view. The second, graver, problem is that utterances like (63) can be used in syllogisms, like the one in (66).
(66) a. If this hotel is good, it is expensive.
b. This hotel is good. c. Therefore, it is expensive. (A & D 1983: 172) The problematic point here is the conditional in (66a). It seems unlikely that the meaning of the antecedent here can be captured by saying that it is an argument for a favourable view of the hotel (or that it is used to recommend the hotel). However, if the meaning of the antecedent is different from that of (66b), the argument can't go through. Anscombre & Ducrot (1983: 173) offer a solution involving the notion of 'delocutivity' (délocutivité). An expression E 2 is derived from an expression E 1 via delocutivity if the form of E 2 is based on that of E 1 but the meaning of E 2 is based, not on the encoded meaning of E 1 (i.e. its semantic value), but on some pragmatic value connected with the utterance of E 1 .
A & D now maintain that there is an E 2 : X is good which attributes a certain property to X and which is derived, via delocutivity, from an E 1 : X is good which has as its meaning that it is an argument for a favourable view of X. According to them, a general law of discourse states that any utterance which is used to argue for something presents itself as being justified by a property of the object with which the argumentation is concerned. After all, A & D believe, if one takes the trouble to argue for a favourable view of an object, then this object must have certain properties which justify the argument. It is this 'pragmatic' aspect of the utterance of E 1 : X is good that gets transferred to the expression E 2 : X is good. The idea is now that syllogisms, like the one in (66), contain expression E 2, which does attribute a property to an object, and not E 1, from which E 2 is derived. Before moving on, let me point out some difficulties with this account.
A major worry, which will no doubt have struck the reader, is that the delocutivity account of is good is completely counterintuitive. It seems odd, to say the least, that the is good that attributes a property to objects is derived from the is good that is an argument for a favourable view, rather than the other way around. From a more theoretical point of view, there are two ways of construing A & D's account. The first is Argumentation Theory 67t hat they are saying that is good has just one meaning (i.e. that it has a unitary semantics), namely that the utterance is an argument for a favourable view of its object(s), and that the delocutive meaning has to be derived (pragmatically) on certain occasions. The problem with this is that the delocutive meaning will have to be derived on many occasions. What is more, it isn't clear how the meaning of good in utterances like (67) could be accounted for.
(67) Good hotels are hard to come by.
It seems obvious that it isn't part of the meaning of (67) that it is an argument for a favourable view of the hotel, but it isn't clear how a hearer could work out on the basis of (67) that good here attributes a certain property to an object if that isn't part of the meaning of good.
The second way of construing A & D's delocutivity account is that it amounts to the postulation of an ambiguity in is good. However, this is completely unnecessary, because, if the meaning of is good were assumed to be that it attributes certain positive properties to objects, it would fall out quite naturally that an utterance containing such an attribution is often an argument for a favourable view of the objects. Admittedly, there is still a question about what property exactly it is that is good does attribute -a possible answer to this will be discussed in the final section.
In spite of the fact that A & D (1983, ch. 7) say they want to move towards a completely non-truth-conditional semantics, which is based on the view that no meaning is primarily descriptive or informational, they (1983: 169) admit that there are a number of utterances, like for example (68)-(70), which seem to be irreducibly informative, and for which they can't account in purely argumentative terms. (68) and (69) Ducrot (1993: 88) & D (1983) in his rejection of truth-conditional meaning. He maintains that no part of meaning is purely objective, i.e. not touched by any, as Ducrot puts it, "pragmatic intentions" (intentions pragmatiques). Note, though, that the examples Ducrot (1993: 89) uses are very close to (62)-(64), the examples used by A & D (1983) to show that some utterances could be accounted for in purely argumentative terms, but not to (68)- (70), the examples A & D (1983) give of purely informative utterances. In other words, Ducrot does not address the examples that one would expect to be addressed by someone making the 'no objectivity' claim. The first set of Ducrot's examples are given in (71) and (72). (71) The film was interesting. (72) The meeting was pleasant.
As with (62)- (64), the argument is that there simply are no objective properties 'interesting' or 'pleasant' and that, therefore, it is impossible to capture the meaning of (71) and (72) in truth-conditional terms. From this, Ducrot (1993: 89) concludes that the meaning of these two utterances must be given in purely argumentative terms. As will be discussed below, I don't believe that the move from the assumption that the meaning of a certain expression is not an objective (fixed, determinate) concept to the assumption that it must be non-truth-conditional (or, at least, that there is no state of affairs corresponding to the concept conveyed by the expression on a given occasion) is legitimate. Nor do I believe that the move from the assumption that the meaning of a certain expression is non-truth-conditional to the assumption that it must be argumentative is acceptable. Nevertheless, the point that there is no single objective property 'interesting' or single property 'pleasant' is valid and any account of the meaning of words like interesting and pleasant will have to take this into account.
Ducrot's next two examples, also intended to demonstrate the impossibility of giving truth conditions to utterances, require a greater leap of the imagination. The first one of these is given in (73), uttered by a parent to a child who is getting a bit too close to a dog.
(73) Don't touch: it's dirty. Ducrot (1993: 89) is interested in the indicative it's dirty. He claims that the meaning of this is not, as one might expect, that it gives a description of the dog, but rather that it is an argument for not touching it. Ducrot starts by saying that for the child, it's dirty can't Argumentation Theory 69b e a description of the dog, because the child doesn't know anything about the adjective dirty, other than that it is used as a justification for orders not to touch, not to eat, or, more generally, to stay away from things. He admits that the parent uttering (73), will see it's dirty as a description of the dog which is part of an argument with the conclusion don't touch. However, Ducrot believes that this is an illusion, because the parents would find it difficult to define dirtiness in terms which don't allude to the fact that it justifies forbidding things.
The final example Ducrot (1993: 89) uses is (74), which should be imagined as uttered by a speaker who is trying to get the hearer to do something.
(74) Be reasonable. (74) is not a case of a proposition (the hearer is reasonable) being uttered with directive illocutionary force as the standard speech act account would have it (e.g. Searle 1979 ). According to Ducrot, the semantic value of the adjective reasonable consists in the fact that it presents an act as one that must be performed. In other words, for Ducrot (1993: 89-90) , the meaning of reasonable is purely argumentative; the word does not encode a propositional constituent. His justification is that he can't see what propositional constituent that could be.
Ducrot believes that
Ducrot's accounts of is dirty in (73) and be reasonable in (74) are both incredibly counterintuitive. I, for one, have no difficulty at all in thinking of a definition of dirtiness which has absolutely nothing to do with forbidding things. In fact, a quick glance at any dictionary of English (or French, or any other language with a word corresponding to dirty) will show that there are numerous definitions of dirtiness which don't have anything to do with forbidding things. Similarly, I can see reasonably easily what fragment of a proposition reasonable could encode (and, again, I'm sure most dictionaries would be on my side). Furthermore, if the meaning of be reasonable is described exhaustively by saying that it describes acts as ones that must be performed, what is the meaning of an utterance like (75)?
(75) Susan has always tried to be reasonable.
To return to Ducrot, after using the examples discussed above to argue against a truthbased semantics, he goes on to state how a purely argumentative semantics could work. For this, he uses the notion of topos introduced above, and the notion of polyphony, which will be discussed briefly here.
Polyphony.
Polyphony is a central notion of AT. It is based on the idea that the views of more than one person can be behind a text or utterance. This idea was first explored in literary criticism, e.g. by Bakhtin. According to Ducrot (1984: 173) , his own work is an extension of Bakhtin's from literary criticism into linguistics. In what follows, a brief description of polyphony in linguistics will be given, along with some of its applications in AT. I will also mention some criticisms of Ducrot's linguistic theory of polyphony.
According to Ducrot (1993: 90) , the meaning of an utterance consists in a characterisation of its own uttering. This uttering is characterised as the confrontation of different 'voices' or 'points of view', which interact with each other. The idea is that the (usually unique) speaker (locuteur) doing the uttering stages a dialogue inside her own monologue between different points of view (énonciateurs). It is important to note that neither locuteur nor énonciateurs are construed as real people. Rather, Moeschler & Reboul (1994: 326) stress that they are theoretical constructs, although actual people can get to be identified with locuteurs and énonciateurs. This notion that every utterance is a manifestation of different interacting points of view is what is referred to, in AT, by the term 'polyphony' 27 . The following are some of the linguistic phenomena which, according to Ducrot (1984) , exhibit the points of view of more than one (theoretical) individual (or of someone other than the individual who is actually doing the uttering): direct and indirect reported speech, ironical utterances, utterances containing but and negative utterances. The most obvious of these are cases of reported speech, be it direct reported speech, as in (76a), indirect reported speech, as in (76b), or free direct reported speech, as in (76c). On Ducrot (1984: 210-213 )'s account, if (77) is uttered ironically, it will represent not the actual speaker's view, but somebody else's (whether that person actually uttered the ords or not and whether there actually is a specific person whose view is being expressed or not) 28 .
(77) Life is beautiful.
In an utterance containing but, the presence of two different points of view makes itself felt in a different way. Remember that A & D analyse but as indicating that the two conjuncts have opposite argumentative orientations. Thus, Peter is rich will have opposite argumentative orientation to I like him in (78).
(78) Peter is rich but I like him.
Remember also that, at least in earlier AT, two utterances were said to have opposite argumentative orientations if they were arguments for opposite conclusions. In (78), Peter is rich could, for example, be an argument for I don't like Peter, whereas I like him clearly is an argument for I like Peter. Now, the point is that one and the same person (or theoretical individual) can't argue for I like Peter and I don't like Peter at one and the same time 29 . Finally, negation is the simplest example of polyphony, according to Ducrot. The idea is that every utterance containing a negation involves the presentation of at least two points of view: the positive counterpart of the utterance and the negative utterance itself. Thus, (79), taken from Nyan (1998: 60), will be analysed as comprising the two viewpoints in (80a) and (b).
(79) Ludwig isn't an ordinary dog. (80) a. Ludwig is an ordinary dog.
b. Ludwig isn't an ordinary dog.
In most cases, the speaker will be seen as identifying with the viewpoint in (80b), but in cases of irony, for example, the speaker will be seen as identifying with (80a). This might be seen as a good way of accounting for the intuition that utterances containing negations always also make immediately accessible their positive counterparts.
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The biggest problem with Ducrot's linguistic notion of polyphony, as pointed out by Moeschler & Reboul (1994: 332-333) , is that it leads to an incredible proliferation of theoretical entities: Not only can each utterance comprise a multitude of énonciateurs and more than one locuteur on a basic level, but Ducrot (1984: 224) also conceives of cases where first-level énonciateurs are manipulated by higher-level énonciateurs. What's more, this proliferation of theoretical entities wouldn't be necessary if, instead, a notion were developed of real people representing other (real) people's thoughts and utterances (or, indeed, thoughts and utterances which are not attributed to anybody in particular) 30 .
Some radical consequences of radical argumentativism.
Overall, the picture Ducrot (1993) paints is the following. All linguistic meaning can be captured in purely argumentative terms. That is, every utterance can be described as a collection of topoi, which constitute different points of view, and there is nothing about language as such that is informative, i.e. language is not cut out to be used to describe states of affairs. As Ducrot (1993: 96) points out, this gives rise to some important questions. The first question Ducrot mentions is this: if language really does not say anything true or false about the world, how come speakers believe that they are using language to give true descriptions of the world (at least sometimes)? Ducrot (1993: 97) 's answer to this question is that speakers' (and hearers') impression that language is informative is an illusion.
The second question he raises is: given that linguists use language to describe how language works and given that that language (as assumed by Ducrot) cannot say anything about the world, how can linguists ever say anything true about language? Ducrot (1993: 97) first notes that this question is too important and too far-reaching in its implications for it to be answered in a few words. He then considers the possible answer that linguists should try to construct a metalanguage which is descriptive in nature (a logical language, such as the predicate calculus, for example). After stating that this is what all linguists, including himself in the present paper, are trying to do, he says that he feels that it is an impossible task. Finally, he concludes that linguistics should be seen, not as a scientific discipline, but as an essentially critical one and that the aim of semantics should not be to try and describe the actual meaning of utterances but to destroy the illusion that utterances convey information about things. In his own words: ne deuxième issue possible est de fixer à la sémantique linguistique un objectif essentiellement critique:. [sic] Elle ne viserait pas à décrire ce que signifie vraiment le discours: elle viserait seulement à détruire l'illusion sans cesse renaissante selon laquelle le discours donnerait des informations sur les choses. Elle enseignerait avant tout à se méfier de la parole. Ducrot (1993: 98, his emphasis) 6 Some pros and cons of AT, and a cognitive alternative
AT evaluated
So far in this paper I have sketched the beginnings of AT, its most important developments and the point it seems to have reached at present. At each stage, I have pointed out problems with A & D's accounts either in footnotes or in the body of the text. In this section, I would like to recapitulate some of the problems mentioned earlier and expand on those that have merely been hinted at. First, however, let me mention some of AT's strong points. Without a doubt, a lot of good, analytical work has been done within the framework of AT and, in its earlier forms, it is based on some interesting observations. Argumentation Theory is obviously right, and certainly not alone, in noticing the existence and the importance of non-truth-conditional aspects of linguistic meaning, and in pointing out the existence of words whose meaning is essentially subjective, like interesting, pleasant, etc. Anscombre & Ducrot's work highlights some very interesting linguistic phenomena, such as the difference between as tall as and the same height as discussed above, the difference between little and a little discussed in A & D (1989: 82-83) , and the difference between he is 36 and he is only 36 (Nyan 1998: 52) . These are all phenomena a successful semantic theory will have to account for. A & D (e.g. 1976 & 1983) 's accounts of the meaning of but and even are particularly insightful. Finally, there is the idea, discussed for example by Õagar (1999:1-2) , that utterances like (44) are not usually made just to let a hearer know what time it is, but also to communicate something else, for example any of (81a)-(d). Clearly, this idea has been widely accepted by linguists and philosophers of language, at least since Grice. However, it is doubtful whether topical forms, which are part of the meaning of the deep structure underlying an utterance, are the right tool for explaining this phenomenon. Now, let me move on to some of my worries with AT. As argumentation theorists would no doubt be the first to agree, in AT's earlier incarnations there were problems with specific definitions, especially those of argumentative potential, argumentative orientation and strength, when they were couched in terms of conclusions. Furthermore, at the stage where A & D accounted for the meaning of utterances by assigning asserted and presupposed content to their underlying deep structures there was a proliferation of mechanisms, laws and axioms whose existence wasn't always independently justified (for instance, the law governing the use of even discussed in section 3.4). Another worry at that stage in the theory's development was that the compositionality of the meaning of deep structures was only guaranteed to the level of core deep structures, whose meaning could not be decomposed further. In other words, the contribution made by individual lexical items that are not argumentative operators and the syntactic structure of the sentence are not addressed.
The intermediate step of introducing the notion of act of arguing solved some of those problems but also created some new ones, notably for A & D's account of the meaning of but. However, it is the last step in the development of AT, namely the introduction of topoi and topical forms along with abandoning any kind of informational, descriptive or truth-conditional contents, which has created the most serious problems for the theory. In particular, I will here discuss two problems with later AT.
The first is this: Given that the meaning of each utterance merely provides an entry point to a topical field and thus gives access to an infinite number of topoi, how can it be that any conclusions are ever reached? For example, an utterance like (82) gives access to a multitude of topoi, including T1: 'the warmer the weather, the nicer the beach', T2: 'the warmer the weather, the less pleasant the work', T3: 'the warmer the weather, the shorter the skirts', etc., and their opposites.
(82) It's hot.
How do A & D explain that, on any given occasion, competent hearers are usually able to figure out which conclusion(s) the speaker is intending him to draw (and, therefore, which topoi to use). Furthermore, how does the hearer know that it's the weather the speaker is talking about and not the food the hearer has just placed in front of her? And how does the hearer know that with the word hot the speaker meant to describe the temperature and not the spiciness of the food? Clearly, these are the questions a Argumentation Theory 75p ragmatic theory is traditionally expected to answer. However, A & D's integrated pragmatics does not seem to address, much less answer them. What is needed here is clearly a non-integrated pragmatics, a notion for which A & D do not seem to make any provision. At this point an argumentation theorist might protest: This criticism isn't fair, because A & D never set out to answer the questions above; AT is strictly a semantic theory. Let's assume that this is so, even though A & D do not explicitly state it anywhere. In that case, one would expect AT to meet the basic requirements of a semantic theory, such as compositionality. However, if the meaning of predicates is given by bundles of topoi, it is not clear how the compositionality requirement can be met. Furthermore, while AT does offer accounts of the meaning of predicates like work and argumentative operators like but, it is not clear how the meaning of other linguistic elements, such as referential expressions, quantifiers, tense, etc., would be characterised in AT. However, these are small worries compared with the second problem I want to discuss here.
In a nutshell, a theory which ends up saying that language cannot be used to describe the world, be it the actual or some other possible world, and doesn't have a good explanation of why it is that people nevertheless not only believe that language is used to convey information but are also prepared to act on information they have been given by purely linguistic means, simply cannot be adequate. After all, people act on purely linguistically conveyed information all the time. For example, I go to the station for 11 o'clock because my friend has told me that her train arrives at eleven, and she is quite likely to have gone to the station at a certain time at her end because someone told her there'd be a train then. More generally, and more importantly, there are many things we only know today because someone wrote them down or told them to someone else. If our impression that we are conveying information using language is just an illusion, it must be an illusion so strong and widespread that every single human in the world not only believes in it but also regularly acts on it. As mentioned above, the step from recognising the existence of non-truth-conditional meaning to abandoning the notion that language is used to represent the world is not supported with enough evidence. What is more, even if the meaning communicated by most words is subjective, this does not mean that the notion of truth conditions has to be abandoned altogether.
These two problems with later AT show that the theory is let down by its failure to make a principled distinction between semantics and pragmatics and by its resolutely anti-cognitive stance. I'd now like to look at how a cognitive theory with a clear semantics/pragmatics distinction can solve problems concerning linguistic subjectivity without discarding the notion of truth conditions or the idea that people use language to convey information about the world, while at the same time acknowledging that this is not all language is used for. 76 
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Relevance Theory, linguistic subjectivity and truth conditions
The cognitive approach to semantics and pragmatics taken by Sperber & Wilson (1986) 's Relevance Theory (RT), reconciles the notion of truth conditions and the idea of subjective aspects of meaning, even if truth conditions are applied to mental representations rather than linguistic expressions. The first ingredient needed for such an account is a clear, cognitive, semantics/pragmatics distinction.
On the RT view, utterance interpretation involves two distinct cognitive processes: decoding and inference. On encountering an utterance, a hearer first decodes the meaning of the words and their syntactic relations, which leads to an incomplete conceptual (i.e. mental) representation. He then uses his inferential abilities guided by the communicative principle of relevance (see Sperber & Wilson 1995: 266-278) to recover a fully propositional representation, i.e. the proposition expressed, along with a range of purely implicitly communicated assumptions. On this view, anything that is encoded by the linguistic expression of an utterance falls into the realm of semantics. This includes the kind of meaning dealt with by A & D's integrated "pragmatics". In RT, pragmatics is concerned with any aspect of inferentially recovered meaning. This includes inferentially recovered elements of the proposition expressed.
31
It is an important part of the RT view that the linguistically encoded meaning of all utterances radically underdetermines what the speaker actually intends to communicate.
32 This is where there is room for subjectivity in linguistic meaning. There are two ways in which Relevance Theory could account for an example like (71).
33
(71) The film was interesting.
On any relevance theoretic account, (71) would be seen as encoding an incomplete conceptual representation. That is, as it stands, the representation encoded by (71) is 31 For a discussion of the RT semantics/pragmatics distinction in relation to other construals of the distinction see Carston (1998: 38-50) and Carston (1999) . 32 For an in-depth discussion of the role of underdeterminacy in RT see Carston (1998, ch. 2) . 33 In fact, RT would account along similar lines for the meaning of red and square in (68) and (69), in which A & D (1983: 169) detected no traces of subjectivity.
(68)The table is square.
(69)The tablecloth is red.
erely a template for a fully propositional (mental) representation. In other words, what is encoded by the words in (71) is a radical underspecification of the proposition expressed (which, on the RT view, is a conceptual representation) -for example, the referent of the film and the temporal reference of the past tense have to be supplied pragmatically. However, when it comes to the question what exactly the word interesting encodes, there are two possibilities.
The first possibility is to say that interesting encodes a concept which will have to be narrowed down and/or expanded, according to the context. This would mean that the concept that appears in the mental representation (thought) of a speaker uttering (71) (and in that of a hearer who has understood the utterance 34 ) is not the same as the concept encoded by the word interesting; they are rather what Carston (1996 Carston ( , 1998 calls 'ad hoc' concepts, pragmatically constructed by the hearer in the process of interpretation.
The second possibility is that interesting does not encode a full concept at all, but rather what Sperber & Wilson (1998: 184/5 ) have termed a 'pro-concept'. This would mean that the semantic contribution of interesting in any utterance must be contextually specified. The difference between the two possible accounts is that, on the first one, interesting does have a literal (conceptual) meaning, which will get enriched or loosened depending on the context. On the second account, on the other hand, interesting does not have a literal, determinate meaning: rather, as in the case of pronouns, its meaning on any given occasion has to be contextually determined. For the purposes of this paper, it seems unimportant which one of these possibilities is chosen. The point is that, on either account, once the hearer has narrowed down or filled in the concept encoded by interesting, there will be an aspect of a state of affairs that is represented by the ad hoc concept or contextually determined value of the pro-concept. In other words, it will be possible to specify the truth conditions of the mental representation entertained by the hearer after he has processed an utterance of (71), it's just that the concept INTERESTING*, where the asterisk indicates that the concept in question is ad hoc or a completed pro-concept, featuring in the hearer's mental representation is not (exactly) what's encoded by the word interesting. In this way, Relevance Theory provides a framework for handling subjective aspects of meaning without having to make the unacceptable claim that language cannot be used to convey information about the world.
Iten
At this point, something should be said about the role of truth conditions in Relevance Theory. Even though what has been said so far in this section might make one think that RT is a truth-conditional theory of linguistic semantics, this is actually not the case. The central claim of a traditional truth-conditional semantics is that linguistic meaning can be captured in terms of truth conditions. This entails the view that words directly correspond with (aspects of) states of affairs in the world. This is not the relevancetheoretic view: virtually no sentence in a natural language encodes a determinate truth condition. In RT, most words are seen as corresponding with mental representations of (aspects of) states of affairs, not with the states of affairs themselves. These mental representations are what is meant by 'concept' in RT; words which correspond to such representations encode concepts. However, not all words are seen as encoding concepts; some words encode computational information concerning the manipulation of concepts rather than concepts themselves. These words are referred to as encoding procedural information.
In RT, the notion of truth conditions comes in at the level of mental representations. These (or, at least, many of them), represent states of affairs and can, therefore, be given truth conditions. Thus, words encoding concepts, i.e. mental representations, could be said to have indirectly truth-conditional meaning 35 . Words encoding procedural meaning, on the other hand, cannot be said to have truth-conditional meaning even in an indirect sense. What they do is constrain or direct the hearer's pragmatic inferencing 36 . Many of the expressions AT deals with (and which were instrumental in leading A & D to abandon a truth-conditional semantics), like for instance but and even, would be seen, within a relevance theoretic framework, as encoding procedural rather than conceptual information.
Finally, I would like to say something about those aspects of utterance interpretation that argumentation theorists have captured in terms of topoi and the conclusions they license. RT would absolutely agree that utterances like (44) are not usually made just to inform the hearer of the time and that, indeed, speakers are likely to want to convey something additional, e.g. any of (81a)-(d).
